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a b s t r a c t
We examine underlying conﬂicts between technological capabilities and global production networks in
South Africa's solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind energy industries. This includes an analysis of the
complex and multi-scalar relationships that exist between international and local institutions, as well as
the embedded nature of renewable energy technology within a national and international political
economy. In South Africa's case, this encompasses endogenous factors such as the introduction of a
regulatory framework for renewable energy independent power producers as well as international dy-
namics such as rapidly evolving trends in renewable energy investment, trade, and technology devel-
opment. While South Africa's wind and solar industries have been celebrated internationally, tensions
exist within national government between commercial priorities and requirements for economic
development including local content. We provide an empirically rich description to explore how
competition and manipulation have posed obstacles to the localisation of renewable energy technologies
at the national level.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Introduction
South Africa's utility-scale, renewable electricity from inde-
pendent power producers now constitutes a small but signiﬁcant
source of generation alongside its coal-ﬁred, crisis-ridden state-
owned monopoly electricity utility Eskom.1 While a number of
studies have explored the policies and politics behind the imple-
mentation of a renewable electricity generation sector, (e.g
Eberhard, Kolker, & Leigland, 2014; Baker, 2016), we expand that
focus to examine the signiﬁcant challenges that exist to the creation
of national technological capabilities in renewable energy. Drawing
from literature spanning innovation studies, development policy,
and geography, we ask: what is the political economy of techno-
logical development in solar photovoltaics (PV) and wind in South
Africa? What does this tell us about technological capabilities as
well as emerging international trends?
While the country's renewable electricity industry has been
celebrated internationally (Dodd, 2014), tensions exist between
commercial priorities and requirements for economic development
including local content. Such tensions can be found within national
government between the demands for least cost technology, and
national priorities for the establishment of a local manufacturing
industry and job creation; and between global production net-
works (GPNs) for solar PV and wind technologies and national local
content requirements. Consequently we explore how competition
and manipulation within GPNs have posed obstacles to the real-
isation of the localisation of renewable energy technologies at the
national level. Our analysis separates the experiences of wind and
solar PV given that while both industries are increasingly
competitive, there are signiﬁcant variations that exist between
them in terms of their GPNs and technological capabilities.
Our analytical approach is informed by the literature on tech-
nological capabilities (Bell, 2009) and global production networks
(GPNs) (Coe, 2012). Together these literature facilitate an analysis of
the complex and multi-scalar relationships that exist between in-
ternational and indigenous institutions and the embedded nature
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1 Between 2014 and 2015 the country faced its worst electricity crisis for 40
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of technology within a national and international political econ-
omy. In South Africa's case this political economy includes endog-
enous factors such as the introduction of a regulatory framework
for renewable energy independent power producers, and interna-
tional dynamics such as rapidly evolving trends in renewable en-
ergy investment and technology development. While these
literature are rarely linked, we argue that there is particular rele-
vance for doing so. Firstly because of the GPN literature's recent
engagement with renewable energy technologies (Curran, 2015),
and secondly given the inﬂuence that GPNs can have over the
realisation of technological capabilities at the national or even in-
ternational level, through for example intellectual property re-
strictions, access to capital, or standards.
This paper also draws from and contributes to a growing body of
research on technological innovation and the creation of renewable
energy manufacturing industries in the emerging markets of China
and India (Altenburg, Johnson,& Engelmeier, 2014; Lema, Berger,&
Schmitz, 2012; Fu & Zhang, 2011), green industrial policy in
developed countries (Pegels & Lütkenhorst, 2014), and compari-
sons between the two, for example China and Germany (Dunford,
Lee, Liu, & Yeung, 2013). Moreover, limited consideration has thus
far been dedicated to South Africawith exceptions being Rennkamp
and Boyd (2013), and Mulcahy (2012) given the recent emergence
of the industry. The ﬁndings of this paper therefore may have
important policy implications for other non-OECD countries in the
sub-Saharan African continent and elsewhere which have recently
embarked, or are about to embark, on programmes for the
deployment of utility-scale electricity generation from renewable
energy, for instance Tanzania, Namibia, Mexico and Uruguay.
Our paper's primary source of data is ﬁeld work undertaken
between 2013 and 2015 (Baker, 2015; Baker, Burton, Godinho, &
Trollip, 2015). This includes 47 semi-structured research in-
terviews with members of the renewable energy industry, gov-
ernment departments, the electricity utility, the ﬁnancial sector,
civil society and labour in South Africa (see Annex 1). The ﬁeld work
also involved site visits to renewable energy projects and
manufacturing/assembly facilities. A number of the interviews are
cited here but individuals have been heavily anonymised due to the
commercially and politically sensitive nature of the material. For
the same reason it has not been possible to disclose detailed in-
formation pertaining to the facilities visited.
As a secondary method, we also draw from signiﬁcant content
analysis of government documents and policies as well as grey
literature on renewable energy technology. One challenge to this is
that many of the bid documents for the country's renewable energy
independent power producers' procurement programme, the RE
IPPPP, are not available in the public domain. For this reason we
have drawn frompublicly available secondary sources. The research
is also informed by a long-term and systematic consultation of
media sources on the renewable energy industry in South Africa
and globally, including: Engineering News, ESI-Africa, Wind Power
Weekly and Recharge News. Given the breath of the subject matter,
the research does not pretend to be exhaustive and in light of the
fast moving nature of the topic inevitably contains some empirical
gaps.
The paper's structure is as follows. Firstly we outline our
analytical framework before setting out the national context from
which the country's renewable electricity generation sector has
emerged.We then consider the national measures and systems that
exist for the support of technological capabilities in renewable
energy. We proceed to explore how tensions between the two
concepts of global production networks and technological capa-
bilities play out within the South African context, which together
with the themes of competition and manipulation, are further
illustrated with two case studies of wind and solar PV.
Linking technological capabilities and global production
networks
Our analytical framework draws from two literature which
though related, are rarely combined: technological capabilities and
global production networks. In tandem, such conceptsdone
emphasising the nature of indigenous technological development
and innovation, the other the interlinkages between local, national,
and international supply chainsdenable us to reveal the networks
of ﬁrms and institutions participating in South Africa's renewable
energy sector. We maintain that together these concepts offer a
more nuanced and complete picture of the political economy of
technological development and allow us to consider dimensions
such as the distribution of power within those networks (Bridge,
2008); the signiﬁcance of skills development (Lall, 1993); the role
of trade and the deepening international division of labour across
global value chains (Curran, 2015); and broader political, socio-
cultural, and environmental implications resulting from these
trends (Coe, Dicken, & Hess, 2008; Gerefﬁ et al., 2005).
Acknowledging the diversity of literature on technological ca-
pabilities, Bell and Pavitt (1993) deﬁne this concept as a spectrum
that spans from ‘production capabilities’ to advanced ‘innovation
capabilities’. While the former refers to the operation and main-
tenance of existing products and processes, the latter refers to the
ability to innovate to the extent of developing new products and
processes. Consequently, Bell and Albu (1999:1717) argue that
technology, rather than just machinery “is a much more complex
body of knowledge, with much of it embodied in a wide range of
different artefacts, people, procedures and organisational ar-
rangements”. Technological change therefore goes beyond the
mere diffusion of hardware such as designs, complete equipment
and installation services, which was a common perspective on
production and trade until late 1960s (Bell, 2009). Rather, ‘soft-
ware’, such as skills, system building and knowledge ﬂows is sig-
niﬁcant for its ability to contribute to the accumulation of
knowledge stocks and resources often referred to as ‘technological
capabilities’. Technology and technological innovation therefore,
are part of numerous inter-linked, comprehensive and interactive
processes and bundles, for which reason the transfer of physical
assets alone will be inadequate to ensure the development and
acquisition of the know-how necessary to reproduce technology
hardware (Lema, Iizuka, &Walz, 2015). This is particularly the case
in the international solar PV and wind industries which are
growing in technical complexity.
The case of South Africa illustrates concepts central to techno-
logical capabilities, including the nature of technology transfer to
developing countries and related deﬁnitions of research and
development (R&D); knowledge spill-overs and knowledge leakage
(Bell & Pavitt, 1993); industry clusters and innovation systems (Bell
& Albu, 1999); and the Asian driver debate at the centre of which is
the notion of China as the ‘workshop of the world’ (Lema et al.,
2012:40). Our study also illustrates long-standing debates over
the relationship between imported technology and indigenous
technological development in low and middle income countries
(Lall, 1993, 1987). This includes the difﬁculties of transplanting
foreign technology into a country where adapted institutions have
not evolved jointly, resulting in serious incongruities and disrup-
tions (Mokyr, 1998). Byrne et al.'s (2011:29) discussion on the
increasing ‘knowledge embeddedness’ of energy technologies and
the requirement for increasingly specialised technical knowledge
are similarly relevant. As Schmidt and Huenteler (2016) point out,
while there has been signiﬁcant renewable energy technology
diffusion in non-OECD countries, the ability of such countries to
successfully implement industry localisation beyond the point of
installation, and operation and maintenance is much less evident
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and more research is therefore needed here. Finally such themes
link to ongoing yet unanswered questions over what the role of
technology transfer should be in contributing to solutions to
climate change mitigation and climate ﬁnance (Lema et al., 2015;
Ockwell & Mallett, 2013).
We engage the concept of GPNs in order to examine how re-
lationships between national dynamics and international forces
have inﬂuenced technological pathways and renewable energy
supply chains in South Africa to date. As a challenge to the related
perspectives of Global Value Chains (Gerefﬁ et al., 2005) and Global
Commodity Chains (Bair, 2005) which tend to make linear as-
sumptions about the nature of production systems (Henderson
et al., 2002), the GPN approach is concerned with the ‘structural
and relational’ (Coe et al., 2008) nature of the multi-scalar network
conﬁgurations that exist between the local and the global, and
assumes governance arrangements as complex. Signiﬁcant for our
study, such an approach allows for an analysis of interactions be-
tween local actors and production networks at various geograph-
ical sites and scales. Above and beyond a focus on the ﬁrm, often
common in the technological capabilities literature, the GPN
approach also encourages a focus on institutions such as govern-
ment agencies, trade unions, civil society and multi-lateral
agencies, and the territories within which they are embedded
(Coe, 2012). The GPN's concern with the interconnectedness and
uneven development of the global economy and power relations
within global relationships (Chester & Newman, 2014; Coe &
Yeung, 2015) is similarly poignant.
However it is only recently that the GPN literature has started to
engage with questions of trade and production in renewable en-
ergy. Current contributions, to which this paper adds, include
Dunford et al. (2013) on Chinese and German solar energy in-
dustries, Gallagher and Zhang (2013) on China's PV industry, and
Curran (2015) on trade policy and the solar PV industry. We also
speak to a number of gaps that have been identiﬁed within the GPN
literature, including an analysis of the role of ﬁnance (Coe et al.,
2014), considerations of competitive dynamics (Coe & Yeung,
2015), greater consideration of the political economy of trade,
development and geographical interdependence (Dunford et al.,
2013:16), and the need to better understand the role of Chinese
ﬁrms on GPN dynamics (Curran, 2015).
While there is limited explicit concern within GPNs for tech-
nological capabilities and innovation, with exceptions including
(Ernst & Kim, 2002), a better understanding of the role of GPNs can
offer a powerful explanation for factors that may assist with or
prevent the realisation of technological capabilities at the national
level. With this in mind, one of the central concerns of this paper is
the key tensions that exist between the realisation of national
priorities for employment generation, skills development and
increased local manufacturing and on the one hand, and the de-
mands by ﬁnancial institutions for project ‘bankability’ on the
other. However, before exploring tensions between these two
concepts in section 4, we ﬁrstly establish the national context for
the emergence of South Africa's renewable energy industry.
A regulatory framework for renewable energy
With a “highly energy intensive economy” compared to its
neighbours (Hancock, 2015), South Africa's economic development
has been characterised by its ‘minerals-energy complex’ (Fine &
Rustomjee, 1996) with a historical core based on cheap energy
and cheap labour for mining and related minerals beneﬁciation.
With high levels of poverty and inequality, to which energy access
is no exception (Sovacool & Rafey, 2011; Baker, 2014) South Africa's
monopoly electricity utility Eskom, which supplies 90 per cent of
the country's coal-ﬁred electricity and accounts for 45 per cent of
national emissions, is now debt and crisis ridden. Furthermore,
despite the continued signiﬁcance of coal to the country's elec-
tricity supply, in 2009 the government committed to reduce the
country's greenhouse gas emissions by 42 percent below business
as usual by 2025 (RSA, 2015). The country's economic dependence
on its energy intensive industries is also subject to shifts and
ﬁnancial and business services now account for 24 per cent of GDP
(Bhorat, Hirsch, Kanbur, & Ncube, 2014).
Changes in the country's economic growth path have been
paralleled by notable shifts in energy policy. Firstly various stalled
attempts in recent decades to introduce both independently pro-
cured power and renewable energy eventually culminated in sig-
niﬁcant national developments for the introduction of renewable
energy into the country’s monopoly controlled coal-ﬁred grid.
Notably in May 2011 the Department of Energy launched the
country's ﬁrst Integrated Resource Plan for electricity (IRP). While
this allows for an increase in coal-ﬁred generation it also allows for
17.8 gigawatts (GW) of capacity to come from renewable energy
which will produce approximately nine per cent of electricity
supply by 2030.
The IRP was swiftly followed by the launch of the Renewable
Energy Independent Power Producers' Procurement Programme
(RE IPPPP) in 2011 (Baker & Wlokas, 2015). The country has since
become a leading destination for renewable energy investment.
Since mid-2015 a number of solar PV projects have become
competitive with new build coal-ﬁred power plants (ESI-Africa,
2014) in keeping with growing global trends which see renew-
able energy reaching grid parity with conventional sources of en-
ergy generation (UNEP/BNEF, 2015). Under the ﬁrst four bidding
rounds of RE IPPPP, 13 GW of capacity has now been allocated, of
which 92 projects amounting to 6.3 GW contracted. Of this 3346
megawatts (MW) is for wind and 2297MW for solar PV, reasons for
selecting these two technologies in this study. As of September
2016, 42 projects with a total capacity of approximately 2 GW had
been connected to the grid, constituting approximately 2.4 per cent
of supply.
South Africa's procurement programme is unique in that the
projects in question must structure local communities into their
equity share as well as contribute to economic development
criteria, including local content as a key focus of this paper. These
criteria, which align with the country's ‘broad based black eco-
nomic empowerment’ legislation, are a key part of government
commitments to the green economy and a labour intensive
industrialisation path as a way to tackle the country's declining
manufacturing sector, high levels of unskilled labour and an un-
employment rate of 40 per cent.2 Projects that bid under RE IPPPP
are scored 70 per cent on price below a certain tariff cap which
decreases with each round and 30 per cent on economic develop-
ment criteria, 25 per of which is for local content. Despite the
potentially progressive nature of these economic development
criteria, a number of concerns have been raised over their long-
term effectiveness, including the extent to which they may help
to generate long-term employment and a local manufacturing in-
dustry and the increasing ownership of the renewable energy in-
dustry by large international companies (Baker, 2015) as the
following sections discuss in more depth.
Local content is deﬁned as a percentage of project expenditure
spent in South Africa, speciﬁcally, as “the total costs attributed to
the project at the commercial operation date, excluding ﬁnance
charges, land and mobilisation fees of the operations contractor”
(DoE 2011:8). Consequently, its accurate measurement has been
2 This ﬁgure includes formal deﬁnitions of 25 per cent unemployment in addition
to ‘discouraged work seekers’ who have given up ﬁnding work.
L. Baker, B.K. Sovacool / Political Geography 60 (2017) 1e12 3
problematic mainly because it is based on Rand value, which as a
ﬂoating exchange rate is subject to signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations over
time and in turn affects the cost of imported products (Ahlfeldt,
2013:xxi). Notably there has been a signiﬁcant devaluation of the
Rand since 2012.
As Table 1 depicts, thresholds and targets for local content have
increased between each bidding round. While under rounds one
and two it was possible to meet the local content requirements
through ‘balance of plant3’, by the third bidding round the
threshold for local content, particularly for wind, was sharply
increased. This means in principle that project developers have to
source more of their project content locally and for some compo-
nents to have been manufactured or assembled in country.
As a result of the increase in thresholds and targets for local
content, a number of manufacturing and assembly plants have
been set up for low technology components as we discuss below. In
addition to assisting project developers to meet local content re-
quirements under RE IPPPP, a number of these facilities anticipate
the potential export of their products both to the African continent
and elsewhere. However as we explore, loopholes in these regu-
lations have resulted in a number of solar PV developers side-
stepping them and importing stock from abroad. Furthermore,
others have argued that the limitedmarket size created by RE IPPPP
to date is inadequate to generate local production and therefore the
technological upgrade and job creation impacts will remain at the
lower and medium technology levels (Rennkamp & Westin, 2013;
Mulcahy, 2012). This echoes Bell and Albu's assertion (1999) that
local content requirements alone are more likely to beneﬁt short-
term activities than a long-term local manufacturing industry
with high levels of domestic ownership and ‘technological capa-
bilities’. The consideration of further measures are now discussed
in section 4.
National systems for technological capabilities
An upper middle income economy in terms of GNI per capita,
South Africa faces signiﬁcant challenges to its national system of
innovation, including high levels of inequality, unemployment, and
unskilled labour and poor levels of education. By the Department of
Science and Technology's (DST) own admission, the concept of a
national system of innovation has limited traction, both in the
extent to which it is “understood as something wider than the sum
of traditional research and development (R&D) activities, and in the
extent to which it had been fully absorbed into the strategies of key
actors (including government departments and higher education
institutions)” (DST, 2012). Signiﬁcantly, the country does not have a
well-established industry for the manufacture of renewable energy
equipment (Ahlfeldt, 2013: xiv; Walwyn & Brent, 2015), or indeed
manufacturing more generally (Bhorat et al., 2014).
Despite this, the country has established a number of national
commitments in order to enable it to establish technological
capabilities for renewable electricity beyond thresholds for local
content. Such commitments are included in a number of national
plans and documents on growth and industrial policy put together
by various different departments. They include the Green Economy
Accord of the Department for Economic Development (EDD, 2011),
the Industrial Policy Action Plan of the Department for Trade and
Industry (DTI, 2013a) and the National Development Plan of the
National Planning Commission (NPC 2013). However these plans
are not necessarily consistent or coordinated (Musango, Brent, &
Bassi, 2014). A number of educational initiatives have also been
set up for the creation of ‘green technical skills’, including at various
technical colleges across the country as well as the establishment of
the South African Renewable Energy Technology Centre in the
Western Cape. Yet regardless how effective any national policy may
be, an evident challenge for South Africa as a late adopter is to break
into increasingly consolidated markets where there is currently a
global surplus of technology equipment and a continuing drop in
technology costs.
This facet is exacerbated by the fact that both wind and solar PV
industries involve trajectories of increasingly complex technology
and are more knowledge than labour intensive (Olsen, 2010:138),
with greater requirements for semi to highly qualiﬁed skills and
often internationally mobile labour. This relates to Lall’s (1993:102)
statement that “the need for formal technology imports rises with
the sophistication of the technology: some technologies can be
mastered relatively easily by only importing equipment; others
needs licensing; and others need (or may only be available under)
equity participation by the technology suppliers … whatever the
choice, however, the developing country has to invest in skills,
R&D, infrastructure and support systems”. But a lack of relevant
skills and expertise in South Africa was identiﬁed by a number of
industry interviewees both at blue collar/artisan level (e.g welders
and cutters in the case of wind) and white collar. Such a scenario
raises questions over which parts of the value chain it makes sense
to localise in the interests of competitiveness and the long-term
maximisation of local employment (Eberhard, 2013). A related
consideration is that of the spatial mobility and volatility of
manufacturing, which as an industrial development zone employee
described [in interview November 2014], “manufacturing is quick.
It comes in and out, like hot money. Europe holds a lot of the in-
tellectual property … South Africa may rather need to look into
applying attention to R&D programmes instead of local content
requirements.”
Studies for the potential of the localisation of wind (DTI, 2015)
and solar PV technologies (Ahfeldt 2013) have been carried out by
various different departments and/or donors and private sector
institutions. Incentives have also been set up or amended to attract
renewable energy investment and manufacturing to South Africa
(DTI, 2013c). Notably, the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act was
approved in May 2014 in order to strengthen a current Industrial
Development Zone (IDZ) Act (DTI, 2014b). In order to be awarded
SEZ status an IDZ must comply with various criteria and
manufacturing facilities in an SEZ qualify for ﬁnancial and other
incentives including a reduced corporation tax rate. The aim of an
SEZ is to keep as much of the value chain process in one place by for
instance supporting a larger manufacturer that would then allow
small, medium and micro enterprises to input into the value chain
e.g through logistics, transport, nuts and bolts, wiring and supply of
personal protective equipment. Ideally this will create economies of
scale in various different industries in order to be able to compete
with the scale of manufacturing from Asia, particularly China.
In parallel to the national policies that facilitated the emergence
of a utility-scale renewable electricity sector following the intro-
duction of RE IPPPP in 2011, a number of exogenous factors have
played a role. More generally these factors include impacts of the
Table 1
Local content targets as a percentage of overall spend, RE IPPPP, Rounds 1-3.
Technology Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Threshold Target Threshold Target Threshold Target
Wind 25% 45% 25% 60% 40% 65%
Solar PV 35% 50% 35% 60% 45% 65%
Source: Adapted from DTI (2013b)
3 In the case of solar PV, all components of the plant other than the panels, and in
the case of a wind farm, all infrastructural components other than the turbine and
tower.
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2008 global ﬁnancial crisis on renewable electricity markets in
Europe and US, which saw the reduction or removal of subsidies by
governments and led to policy uncertainty and a slump in project
development. Subsequently, renewable electricity development
and related investment started to shift to developing countries,
including South Africa. This investment was accompanied by a
manufacturing surplus, which saw European, US and Chinese
companies in particular seeking other markets to absorb this. This
surplus has contributed to ﬁerce competition in South Africa as
reﬂected in dramatic tariff drops4 between rounds one and four of
RE IPPPP, particularly in the case of solar PV technology. Meanwhile
as renewable electricity projects have become more proﬁtable,
banks and investors with a long-term history in conventional en-
ergy infrastructure have developed an emerging interest. The in-
ﬂuence and requirements of ﬁnance as a key contributor to tensions
between technological capabilities and GPNs is now discussed in
further depth in section 5.
Technological capabilities and GPNs in tension
Essentially the South Africa case reveals a tension between na-
tional requirements seeking to enhance and augment technological
capabilities, and pressures fromGPNs. Aswe discuss here and in the
following section, the implementation of local content re-
quirements under RE IPPPP illustrates how the realisation of na-
tional priorities for employment generation, skills development
and increased local manufacturing are at odds with the demands by
ﬁnancial institutions for project ‘bankability’.
International norms of project ﬁnance applied by debt ﬁnanciers
and equity investors have a signiﬁcant determination over the
technology that gets selected for projects approved under South
Africa's RE IPPPP and the company that carries out the engineering,
procurement and construction (EPC) contract and operation and
maintenance (O&M). The EPC phase usually lasts for a two-year
term but with liabilities and equipment warrantees generally
lasting for ﬁve years after construction. On the project's commercial
operation date the O&M contract takes over with a tenure length
that can vary between the full term of the power purchase agree-
ment or a ﬁve-year rolling contract. Given that local content re-
quirements are often considered an investment risk, banks tend to
insist on internationally experienced contractors who have carried
out a minimum number of analogous projects elsewhere in the
world. That the technology in question be ‘proven’ is a fundamental
consideration for the lender with regards to a project's commercial
viability (Yescombe, 2013), relating to Lall's (2001:287) assertion
that the provision of capital by large international ﬁrms in the
equity shareholding of projects often comes packaged with “tech-
nical know-how, equipment, management, marketing and other
skills”. Consequently, contracts for the EPC, O&M and particularly
the technology supply for RE IPPPP have to date been dominated by
international companies (see Figs. 1 and 2).
As the EPC contract is generally the largest cost item in the
budget at an estimated 60e75 per cent of total project cost
(Yescombe, 2013:210), it is considered a major risk, for which
reason South Africa's lenders insisted that under rounds one to
three the EPC provide a fully ‘wrapped guarantee’ or ﬁxed-price
turnkey contract around the whole project. While a fully wrap-
ped EPC in turn increases project costs (Ahlfeldt, 2013:52), it gives
lenders “the conﬁdence and guarantees that the plant will perform
the way you have agreed prior to awarding the contract” (bank
employee, November 2013). However, despite the EPC's overall
responsibility, much of theworkwill be carried out by national sub-
contractors. However such an arrangement does not always run
smoothly given that the foreign contractors in question tend not be
familiar with the speciﬁcs of national requirements and so consider
them a greater risk, which will in turn have cost implications.
There was a general sense that in rounds one and two of RE
IPPPP EPCs could have used more local products and services than
they did, but as foreign companies, lacked the relevant knowledge
to procure nationally available supplies and so ended up importing
them unnecessarily. Similarly, large international technology sup-
ply companies are often bound by their own internal guarantees
and are therefore obliged to deploy their own personnel and ma-
terials from abroad rather than sourcing locally. While there are
national attempts to overcome such restrictions, for instance the
South African Renewable Energy Technology Centre plans to train
service technicians on how to ﬁx cracks in blades [in interview,
December 2014] it is not clear whether this will satisfy the de-
mands of international companywarranties. Safety issues were also
identiﬁed as a constraint. For example, according renewable in-
dustry member (4) [in interview November 2014] “for a 75 MW
solar PV farm, local electrical contractors do not have the resources
to carry the risk of something going wrong in terms of failure to
deliver on time and at the right quantity”.
A further constraint is the requirement that technologies be
certiﬁed by the International Electrotechnical Commission.
Consequently, small, medium and micro enterprises have been
precluded from participating in national renewable energy value as
technology and service providers (Rennkamp & Westin, 2013: 18).
Moreover, the dependence on international suppliers inevitably
implies that a major share of capital expenditure and investments
are leaving the country by way of purchasing technology hardware
from large foreign ﬁrms (Moldvay, Hamann, & Fay, 2013: 4e9).
However some skills transfer from international to national
ﬁrms may be evident in that according to some interviewees, large
international electrical contractors such as ABB and Schneider are
increasingly starting to subcontract to local companies. Further-
more, since round three there has been a shift from a ‘fully wrap-
ped’ EPC to multi-contracting (Ahlfeldt, 2013: 53) which according
to a bank employee (November 2013), “means going forward many
of those sub-contractors can then act as the sole contractor”. While
multi-contracting is more complex to manage in view of the
number of different contractors involved it is also cheaper.
The speciﬁc dynamics of the EPC and O&M in relation to wind
and solar PV are discussed in further depth in section 6.
Conﬂict within government
In addition to tensions between GPNs and local content re-
quirements, other conﬂicts were identiﬁed in terms of ideological
differences within government, most evidently between the Na-
tional Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
Essentially, National Treasury places more emphasis on least cost
and assumes that locally manufactured goods are more expensive
than imported goods. Therefore if local content requirements are
too high then the price of the project will not be competitive. The
DTI meanwhile prioritises the incentivisation of local
manufacturing and associated job creation, and argues that in
addition to cost, various factors such as the type of technology, the
technological component in question and the scale at which it is
manufactured or imported must be taken into account. However
while the DTI is responsible for drafting the local content re-
quirements, the RE IPPPP process is ultimately governed by the
Treasury supported IPP-unit (Eberhard et al., 2014). Treasury
therefore holds the greater sway over how the economic criteria are
4 Since the start of RE IPPPP, the electricity tariffs paid to power producers
submitted by bidding projects have dropped by 75 per cent for solar PV and 50 per
cent for wind.
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deﬁned.
The lack of clarity over local content rules and deﬁnitions has
also enabled international project developers, particularly of solar
PV, to exploit and manipulate loop holes, as discussed in section 6.
A number of industry members concurred that it has been possible
for project developers to game the system by being ‘creative’. One
project developer [interviewed in November 2013] stated that “RE
IPPPP requires high local content which quite honestly foreign in-
vestors have to manipulate to be able to achieve… the process has
got built in contradictions … and the policing of local content
where it could be possible is inadequate”. Consequently re-
quirements can and have been met by back door methods and box
ticking exercises. These loopholes appear to be due to a lack of
understanding by policy makers of the nature of renewable energy
technology supply chains and production processes, a ﬁnding not
necessarily speciﬁc to South Africa (Schmidt & Huenteler, 2016: 9).
As PVmanufacturer (1) explained “we needmuch clearer deﬁnition
of what local content should mean and what a locally produced
module should mean … putting screws into something shouldn't
count as locally manufactured”.
In order to prevent further manipulation of local content re-
quirements by developers and under pressure frommanufacturers,
it is understood that the DTI attempted to reﬁne the rules so that
installation or balance of plant must constitute a certain percentage
of local content and the technology also. However when the bid
documents were released for round four in mid-2014, this did not
materialise: “Everyone expected that for round four Treasury
would issue a clariﬁcation note by component that said for instance
wind towers 30 per cent, blades 10 per cent … but the bid docu-
ments are released and then there is no clariﬁcation note”
[renewable industry member (3), December 2014].
Trade tensions
A ﬁnal issue is how South Africa's local content requirements
align or conﬂict with international trade rules and agreements, an
issue which currently lacks clarity (Kiragu, 2015). This is a battle
likely to be fought in light of an emerging trend of tit for tat trade
and import disputes between various countries, including US, EU,
India, China, Japan and Canada (Curran, 2015; Lewis, 2014a,b). As
Lewis (2014a: 11) explains: “there is a fundamental conﬂict be-
tween the political economy of domestic renewable energy support
and the basic principles of global trade regimes” given that inter-
national trade explicitly prohibits differential support to domestic
over foreign technology.
Wind and solar PV
Having established the national and international context for
such tensions we now examine their impact on the acquisition of
technological capabilities in South Africa's emergingwind and solar
PV sector.
Wind
The increasingly protectionist and competitive nature of the
Fig. 1. Lead Engineering, Procurement and Construction ﬁrms for Solar Photovoltaic (PV) Energy, Rounds 1e3 of the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers' Procurement
Programme.
Source: Compiled by the authors. Note: Ch ¼ China, Fr¼France, It ¼ Italy, G ¼ Germany, Sp ¼ Spain, SA¼ South Africa Figures are based on publicly available information at the time
of writing. The ﬁgures represent the lead EPC companies only and the authors note the national requirement that EPC companies must include a 40 per cent South African entity.
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global wind industry (Lewis, 2014b: 515) with fewer and larger
players that are constantly undergoing mergers and acquisitions5
has restricted the ability of South African companies to develop
their own technological capabilities, particularly at commercial
scale. South Africa's potential for localisation may also be restricted
by limited incentives for leading wind turbine manufacturers to
license information to a company that could in turn become a
competitor and, if in a developing country, more likely to beneﬁt
from cheaper labour (Lewis, 2014b: 1847). Reﬂecting the vertically
integrated nature of the global wind technology supply chain, the
EPC contractor is often the same company as the original equip-
ment manufacturer (OEM), which supplies technology to the
project and in many cases holds the contract for operation and
maintenance. Such companies are able to offer multi-year service
warrantees and have the international reputation and years of
experience required by debt ﬁnanciers and equity investors (Lewis
&Wiser, 2007: 1844). While European companies still dominate in
the EPC and OEMs (see Fig. 1a), including Nordex, Siemens and
Vestas, a signiﬁcant minority of emerging market companies play a
role, including India's Suzlon and China's Sinovel6 in round one of
RE IPPPP, China's Guodian United Power in round three and China's
Goldwind in round four. This reﬂects the growing international
presence of Chinese companies outside of their domestic market as
the world's largest installers of wind capacity, now holding 21 per
cent of market share (Lewis, 2014a: 23).
Localisation of wind power technologies can take a variety of
forms (Lewis & Wiser, 2007) including: the assembly of imported
parts; manufacture of some components or entire turbines; local
technology development through innovation and R&D carried out
by a domestic ﬁrm often in combination with domestic research
organisations; and technology transfer from an overseas ﬁrm via a
licensing agreement which may or may not include the transfer of
technological know-how.
While the construction andmaintenance of most components of
a wind turbine such as blades, gearboxes and power converters
(Lema et al., 2012: 44) require semi to highly specialised expertise,
the skill level required for tower manufacture is more at the level of
‘artisan’ as it does not involve highly sophisticated technology. And
due to its size and weight the tower is the most expensive and
logistically challenging component to import and transport. Under
round one of RE IPPPP all wind towerswere imported given that the
local content requirement of 25 per cent could be met by carrying
out the balance of plant locally. However following the increase in
requirements under rounds two and three (see Table 1), having a
locally manufactured wind tower was sufﬁcient to meet local
content requirements. This is because the tower takes up approx-
imately 12e14 per cent of the project cost [turbine manufacturer in
interview October 2014]. From round four and beyond all towers
need to be manufactured in country.
Consequently two wind tower manufacturing plants have been
set up in South Africa, one run by GRI industries, a subsidiary of
Spanish Cooperacion Gestamp, in the Atlantis IDZ in the Western
Cape and the other by DCD wind towers in the Coega IDZ near Port
Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape. Spanish company Acciona has also
established concrete tower making facilities on its project site for
the Gouda wind farm in the Western Cape. Both GRI and DCD
Fig. 2. Lead Engineering, Procurement and Construction ﬁrms for Wind Energy, Rounds 1e3 of the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers' Procurement Programme.
Source: Compiled by the authors. Note: Ch ¼ China, Fr¼France, It ¼ Italy, G ¼ Germany, Sp ¼ Spain, SA¼ South Africa. Figures are based on publicly available information at the time
of writing. The ﬁgures represent the lead EPC companies only and the authors note the national requirement that EPC companies must include a 40 per cent South African entity.
5 Recent examples include the sale of Acciona to Nordex (Lee, 2015) and the
purchase of UK company, Blade Dynamics by GE (Weston, 2015).
6 Suzlon was to have held a market larger share but lost an EPC contract to
Nordex at the last minute due to concerns of ﬁnancial solvency.
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manufacture towers for OEMs e.g Nordex and Vestas from where
the equipment and the IPR is sourced. The arrangements between
the OEMs and the manufacturers may not only restrict opportu-
nities for innovation spill overs but also prevent the sourcing of
services and supplies from other local companies. Firstly
manufacturing is done under a non-disclosure agreement with the
OEM whereby the local company undertakes only to manufacture
and has no involvement in design. Secondly, because different
OEMs have different designs, skills acquired from working on one
tower will not necessarily be transferrable. Finally the OEMs have
an approved list of which suppliers the factory can buy fromwhich
need to conform to the OEM's quality standards and speciﬁcations.
All other wind technology components for supply to projects
under RE IPPPP are currently imported. With the exception of the
company Adventure Power, which makes small-scale blades, there
are no utility-scale blade manufacturing facilities in South Africa
and this is not currently anticipated. Far greater market certainty
than currently exists would be needed for any blade manufacturer
to set up in South Africa. OEMs such as Vestas and Nordex usually
outsource blade manufacturing to specialised companies such as
LM Blades, headquartered in Denmark. While LM Blades was
considering setting up a blade mould factory in South Africa and
according to renewable industry member (2) [in interview,
December 2014] “was but a signature away”, the company's plans
were shelved following the uncertainty created by the reduction of
thewind allocation in the draft revised IRP in 2013, which has yet to
be concluded (Baker et al., 2015).
An early attempt to set up a national wind manufacturing
company in anticipation of RE IPPPP folded because it was unable to
meet the requirements of project ﬁnance for ‘bankability’ and the
two years' operational experience. Cape Town-based Isivungu-
vunguWind Energy Converter (Pty.) Ltd (I-WEC) was set up in 2009
in the Western Cape. The company imported a blade mould made
in China by Swiss company Gurit under licence from the German
developer Aerodyn (Maritz, 2011). The company set out to manu-
facture “state-of-the-art 2.5 MW wind turbines and rotor blades in
South Africa for the growing local markets” (Rennkamp & Westin,
2013: 18) with an estimated 65 per cent local content. However
the company folded in 2012. As wind industry (2) explained: “Ul-
timately you have to be able to produce a blade that works with a
turbine and that is certiﬁed with that turbine because otherwise
the whole ‘wrapped guarantee’ thing falls through and that is what
IWEC [a South African company] wasn't able to do. They couldn't
provide a parent company guarantee that would satisfy the banks.”
Solar PV
While wind is characterised as ‘design-intensive’, meaning that
it requires “local knowledge networks of suppliers, manufacturers
and users to capture the learning beneﬁts”, solar PV is
‘manufacturing-intensive’, meaning that it requires less local
learning and is more dependent on international networks of
suppliers (Schmidt & Huenteler, 2016: 17). The nature of the solar
PV supply chain is also more dispersed (Curran, 2015), incorpo-
rating many intermediate components such as panels, frames, in-
verters, transformers, tracking system, cable trays, cells and glass.
For this reason, contrary to the case of the wind industry, the
company that carries out the EPC contract for solar PV is less often
involved in the technology supply. There is also greater potential for
innovation in solar PV than wind, given that the latter is more
mature as a technology and therefore harder to break into
(Rennkamp & Boyd, 2013: 12). That said, a number of solar PV
manufacturers have argued that the allocation of approximately
600 MW for solar PV within each round of RE IPPPP has been
insufﬁcient to encourage the development of a local industry.
While the contractors carrying out the EPC are dominated by
European and US companies (see Fig. 2) including Enel Green Po-
wer, Solar Reserve and Scatec Solar, Chinese companies play a
signiﬁcant role in technology supply, reﬂecting China's export
driven industry and its role as the world's largest manufacturer of
solar PV technology. According to Dunford et al. (2013: 31) solar PV
cells and modules made by Chinese manufacturers cost about 50
per cent less than those provided by Germany, the original market
leader until 2008. Not only has this contributed to dramatic tariff
reductions as witnessed in South Africa's case between rounds one
and four of RE IPPPP, but has also been the source of signiﬁcant
international conﬂict, best illustrated by the anti-dumping legis-
lation in the EU and US. While Chinese ﬁrms dominate the
manufacturing of solar panels, other parts of the value chain are
dominated by EU, US and Japanese companies (Curran, 2015: 1035).
The deep inﬂuence that GPNs have on the political economy of
technological capabilities in South African renewable electricity is
further illustrated by ownership patterns related to intellectual
property and hardware associated with solar PV. Chinese solar PV
technology hardware deployed in South Africa is either provided
directly by state-backed or state-owned Chinese companies with
cheap access to capital and strong ﬁnancial support from govern-
ment (Ahlfeldt, 2013: 11) or by companies headquartered else-
where but who source from China where the hardware is made
under licence (Dunford et al., 2013: 30). Chinese solar PV manu-
facturers supplying to projects under RE IPPPP include Suntech,7
Yingli Solar, Trina Solar, Jinko solar, Build Your Own Dreams and
Renesola (Power et al., 2016). While many of these companies are
now integrated into international ﬁnancial markets and listed on
the New York Stock Exchange and/or the NASDAQ, in recent years a
number of them such as Yingli and Trina have run into high levels
of debt (Publicover& Lee, 2015). Meanwhile, the supply of inverters
is dominated by the German company SMA Solar which opened an
inverter factory in Cape Town in December 2014. Many of the
mounting structures are provided by Schletter, also German.
The nature of GPNs in solar PV, coupled with the inadequate
enforcement and deﬁnition of local content rules has resulted in a
number of solar PV developers being able to sidestep local content
rules through ‘transfer pricing’ (Forder 2014). Under transfer pric-
ing, a foreign component supplier in coordination with the project
developer sets up a local company and imports technological
hardware. The price of that hardware is thenmarked up and sold on
to the developer. That mark-up constitutes local content. Transfer
pricing has been possible because as described above, local content
is measured in ﬁnancial spend. As renewable industry member (1)
described [in interview November 2013]: “… companies like Enel8
were able to screw the industry by marking down the cost of
foreign technology tremendously, importing it and then marking it
up in the local company and calling it local content. What they have
done isn't legally wrong it is just ethically wrong.” For this reason
the South African Bureau of Standards have warned of products
being labelled as ‘made in South Africa’ while they are in fact
merely assembled in the country, with more than 90 per cent of
foreign content (DTI, 2014a).
According to the South African Renewable Energy Council,
transfer pricing has meant that solar PV module manufacturers in
South Africa that were set up with the aim of supplying to projects
7 Once the world's largest solar PV equipment maker; following its collapse in
2013, Suntech was bought by Chinese company, Shunfeng Photovoltaic
International.
8 Enel Green Power (EGP) is an Italian company that as lead developer has won
1110 MW of solar PV projects under Rounds 1 to 4. These projects use thin ﬁlm
modules manufactured by 3Sun, of which EGP is now the sole owner.
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approved under RE IPPPP (see Table 2), have had less than two per
cent of their production capacity taken up by local orders. Such
manipulation has led to module manufacturers either seeking
foreign markets (Creamer, 2014) via ‘toll manufacturing’, as dis-
cussed below or have refrained from setting up a manufacturing
plant in South Africa as Trina Solar, one of the top PVmanufacturers
in China, has done (Creamer, 2015). In other cases, manufacturing/
assembly plants also serve as distribution hubs for panels made in
China either by their company or a Chinese client. For instance
Suntech has set up a storagewarehouse in order to increase its sales
capacity to both the South African and African market and elimi-
nate some of the transaction costs involved in the shipping and
import of PV modules.
One solution put forward by the South African solar PV industry
association (SAPVIA) and other stakeholders in order to prevent
transfer pricing is that the module be assembled, framed and most
signiﬁcantly laminated in South Africa. As DTI [in interview January
2015] explained, lamination would mean that people cannot just
bring in “fully imported panels, pack them in boxes and claim local
content for paying people who are packing things in boxes. Lami-
nation seems like a benchmark, because then you would have to
string the cells, laminate, put in glass, a frame, a junction box and
then you have a panel. That is basically the assembly process.”
While investing in the machines that do this is expensive, it is
argued that such an investment will result in job creation and spin
off activities. Renewable industry member (2) stated [in interview
December 2014] “the biggest and easiest thing that was anticipated
from the local content regulations for round four was the require-
ment that modules be laminated in South Africa. This would mean
that these four or ﬁve factories would have had so much work that
theywould have been booked up for the next 12e18months… This
didn't happen.” The fact that lamination was not included in the
bidding requirement for round four is a probable illustration of
National Treasury's power over the bidding process for RE IPPPP
and how local criteria gets deﬁned.
The EU-China solar dispute, which “represents the most signif-
icant anti-dumping complaint the European Commission has ever
investigated” (Lewis, 2014a: 24) has had far reaching impacts,
including in South Africa. Anti-dumping duties were imposed by
the European Commission on imports of solar PV crystalline silicon
modules and cells originating in or consigned from China in
December 2013 (Hopson, 2015), applicable until December 2015.
Measures include minimum pricing and a quota system (Curran,
2015: 3). As a result of transfer pricing, in addition to delays in
the bidding process discussed above, a number of plants in South
Africa have resorted to ‘toll manufacturing’ on behalf of Chinese
manufacturers. Toll manufacturing sees Chinese suppliers sending
component parts (frames, glass, cells etc) to South African com-
panies who assemble the product which the Chinese company then
sells on to European developers. Because the product has been
assembled in South Africa, the Chinese company has thus far
evaded anti-dumping legislation. Similar to other cases docu-
mented by Lewis (2014a,b) this illustrates the ability of Chinese
manufacturers to reconﬁgure their supply chains in order to evade
duties on imports to Europe and the US and the ability of GPNs to
adjust their structures in response to trade restrictions (Curran,
2015). This instance of toll manufacture adds to studies on the
striking differences between the geography of use and the geog-
raphy of manufacture which Dunford et al. (2013) have explored in
the case of Germany and China (see also Lewis, 2014a,b).
Conclusion
This paper forms an early contribution to the emerging theme of
Table 2
Manufacturing and assembly plants for solar PV in South Africa.
Company Technology Type Location Maximum
annual Output
Ownership Finance Opened Comments
Solaire Directe
Southern
Africa (SA)
Solar PV (modules,
wafers invertors and
other)
Belville, Cape Town 80MWper year French/SA JV,
subsidiary of the
Solairedirect Group, the
largest private power
producer in France.
Unknown 2009 Chinese company
ReneSola ltd has a
tolling agreement with
Solaire Directe SA.
Art Solar Solar PV modules Durban, KZN 40MWper year South African owned by
private shareholders.
Unknown 2013 The technology has
been provided by Swiss
and German equipment
manufacturers.
ILB Helios
Southern
Africa
Monocrystalline &
polycrystalline panels.
Lamination in factory
East London
Industrial
Development Zone
120 MW per
year
Subsidiary of Spanish
worker's cooperative,
Mondragon, largest PV
manufacturer in Spain.
IDC provides 50% of
debt and 17% equity. An
IDC-ﬁnanced worker's
cooperative holds 10%
equity
2014 The plant laminates its
panels using German
laminators. It is also a
distribution hub for
panels made in China
by ILB Helios.
Jinko Solar Solar PV modules.
Lamination in factory
Belville, Cape Town 120 MW per
year
JinkoSolar Holdings Co.,
Ltd
Unknown 2014 Jinko's ﬁrst
manufacturing plant
outside China.
Sunpower Solar PV panels Cape Town 160 MW per
year
Unknown Unknown 2015 A French company that
took over the Tenesol
group based in Western
Cape. Sunpower are
developers,
manufacturers, EPC and
IPP.
Suntech Storage warehouse for
modules
Cape Town Up to 500 KW
(storage only)
Wuxi Suntech Power
Co. (Suntech is owned
by Shunfeng Clean
Energy)
Unknown 2015
SMA solar inverters Cape Town Unknown SMA solar Unknown 2014
Source: Authors' own compilation based on interview data and publicly available information
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renewable energy technology capabilities in South Africa. It dem-
onstrates how technology development in these industries has
been shaped by the interaction of territorially embedded factors
with global dynamics. Such dynamics include: the geographically
dispersed nature of global supply chains and production networks
in renewable energy technologies; the determination that ﬁnance
and investment has over technology and innovation pathways; the
rise of emerging market companies, particularly China, in renew-
able energy manufacturing; and trade disputes. It has further
highlighted the adequacy or lack thereof of national local content
policies and other frameworks in enabling the development of
technological capabilities. The extent to which South Africa's local
content requirements and related innovation and industrial policy
will be redeﬁned and enforced to ensure a more meaningful
adherence to local production and the development of national
capabilities is as yet unclear, but remains a crucial area for the long-
term success of the country's emerging industry and an area for
further research.
We have used the theoretical literature of technological capa-
bilities and global production networks as a lens. In doing so, it has
allowed us to develop an analysis that merges international trends
such as trade, ﬁnance and technology costs with the complexities of
a speciﬁc national context, including politics. This is signiﬁcant
given that many studies on technological development are too
focussed on national policy and do not consider global dynamics.
With this in mind, we offer ﬁve conclusions.
First, rather than viewing renewable energy technology policy
as a set of rational processes or deliberative outcomes, it is in fact
much more a series of ‘complex bargaining processes’ (Coe et al.,
2004) between national and international institutions, in turn
bound up within deeper social, political, economic and techno-
logical trajectories. While South Africa's RE IPPPP has been inter-
nationally celebrated for facilitating the very rapid take off of a
utility-scale industry within an otherwise coal-ﬁred, crisis-ridden,
monopoly electricity sector, there are concerns over the extent to
which the potentially progressive economic development criteria
will be realised. Speciﬁcally, the extent to which this will result in a
new industrial base and new areas of technological capability, or
instead result in short-term imported skills for complex, sophisti-
cated technologies. In analytical terms this relates to Lall's
(1993:103) caution that, “until host countries achieve fairly high
levels of development, transnationals tend to transfer the results of
their R&D rather than the innovative process itself”.
Second, and relating to the theme of competitive dynamics
within GPNs (Coe & Yeung, 2015), we have examined how domi-
nant international ﬁrms in renewable energy manufacturing and
technology supply are attempting to reinforce their market power
in South Africa. There is a complexity of relationships and networks
between national and international institutions involved in tech-
nology supply, EPC contracts and manufacturing plants. South
Africa's emerging renewable energy technology market has a
strong and inevitable dependence on global industries, which in
turn poses a key challenge to the country's ability to facilitate a
national manufacturing industry with long-term ownership and
innovative potential. This begs the question therefore, over the
extent to which South African ﬁrms, as relative latecomers, will be
able to develop their own comparative advantage in the face of such
stiff global competition.
Third, this paper has added to two emerging themes in the GPN
literature: ﬁnance (Coe et al., 2014) and technological development
in renewable energy (Dunford et al., 2013), and the powerful
determination that the former has over the latter. In the absence of
a well-established industry for renewable energy manufacture in
South Africa, local content thresholds increase the risk proﬁle of a
project. And because of the risk aversion of lenders, their demands
for ‘proven technologies’ and companies with international repu-
tations, smaller, national players such as I-WEC have been pre-
cluded from participating in RE IPPPP as technology suppliers and/
or service providers.
Fourth, this study demonstrates the geographic differentiation
of renewable energy technology manufacturing and the technology
dependent nature of deployment. In other words, it is a mistake to
treat renewable electricity systems as “equal” in their type and
scope; the political economy of South African wind technology
differs markedly from that of solar PV. As discussed in section 6,
solar PV offers greater potential for innovation than wind, given
that the latter is more mature as a technology. However in the case
of solar PV, technological components are being exported to Europe
in an example of toll manufacturing, and in other cases imported
through the use of transfer pricing in order to avoid the costs
associated with local manufacture. While transfer pricing, as a
signiﬁcant market distortion threatens the sustainability of local
manufacturers, the practise of toll manufacture illustrates the
transient nature of manufacturing/assembly plants being set up in
South Africa given that for the most part, the technology hardware
in question is still owned by international companies. Technology
supply and the EPC for the wind industry meanwhile is dominated
by increasingly large and consolidated multinational companies,
while smaller nationally owned companies have struggled or failed
to gain entry to the market.
Fifth, and perhaps most signiﬁcantly, the paper's ﬁndings reﬂect
the ‘deepening international divisions of labour’ (Curran, 2015) and
the subsequent vulnerability of labour as ‘spatially trapped’ (Coe
et al., 2004: 472) when compared to the international mobility of
production. Rather than being retained and reinvested into the
local or national economy, ﬁnance is likely to leave the country
though the purchase of technology hardware from foreign ﬁrms.
Despite their low-carbon credentials solar PV and wind remain at
the mercy of global capital markets and many of the pitfalls of a
globalised, networked economy. In some ways, such energy sys-
tems can achieve their environmental beneﬁts only by perpetu-
ating broader, inequitable trends at a much larger scale.
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